LAVINE, J.
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j)(3)(B)(i) provides for the termination of parental rights when the child "has been found by the Superior Court ... to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ... and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent ... and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. ..." The specific steps facilitate, but do not guarantee, the return of the child to the parent. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001) (successful completion of expectations not sufficient to defeat claim that parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation). Although a parent may have participated in the programs recommended pursuant to the specific steps ordered, a court may properly find that the parent has failed to achieve rehabilitation. See In re Coby C., 107 Conn.App. 395, 406, 945 A.2d 529 (2008) (rejecting claim that substantial compliance with specific steps bars court from terminating parental rights). In other words, a finding of rehabilitation is not based on a mechanistic tabulation of whether a parent has undertaken specific steps ordered. The ultimate issue the court must evaluate is whether the parent has gained the insight and ability to care for his or her child given the age and needs of the child within a reasonable time. See In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999).
In this matter, the respondent father appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Hon. William L. Wollenberg, judge trial referee, terminating his parental rights with respect to Destiny R. (child), pursuant to § 17a-112 (j)(3)(B)(i).
"Our standard of review on appeal from a termination of parental rights is whether the challenged findings are clearly erroneous. ... The determinations reached by the trial court that the evidence is clear and convincing will be disturbed only if [any challenged] finding is not supported by the evidence and [is], in light of the evidence in the whole record, clearly erroneous. ...
"On appeal, our function is to determine whether the trial court's conclusion was legally correct and factually supported. ... We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached ... nor do we retry the case or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. ... Rather, on review by this court every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court's ruling. ...
"A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition. ... In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights [under § 17a-112 (j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469-70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).
Following a consolidated trial,
The petitioner, the commissioner of children and families, filed a neglect petition that alleged the following jurisdictional facts: the mother has a history of substance abuse and tested positive for marijuana at the time of the child's birth and the parents have a history of domestic violence. At the hearing, department personnel reported that the respondent and the child's mother had been evicted from their apartment and that they had failed to provide a forwarding address. On July 29, 2008, the court, Dannehy, J., adjudicated the child neglected, committed her to the custody of the petitioner and reaffirmed the specific steps previously ordered for the respondent. See footnote 5 of this opinion.
On December 2, 2008, the respondent and the child's mother were arrested on drug related charges. The respondent was jailed for approximately one month, convicted, and given a suspended sentence and three years of probation.
On January 29, 2009, the petitioner filed a permanency plan to terminate the respondent's parental rights with respect to the child and for adoption, a plan supported by the child's attorney. The respondent did not object to the permanency plan, which was approved following a hearing on March 17, 2009.
The respondent and the child's mother had a second child, LR, on May 8, 2009. At the time, the respondent and the mother were living with the child's maternal grandfather in a one bedroom apartment. The respondent and the child's mother later were able to find an apartment of their own. On May 19, 2009, the petitioner filed a revised permanency plan to reunify the child with her parents, and the
On December 17, 2009, Judge Dannehy found that cause for the child's commitment no longer existed and ordered six months of protective supervision for her, until June 17, 2010. The court also ordered final steps for the respondent that were in addition to those steps set forth in footnote 5 of this opinion.
The respondent was arrested again on February 25, 2010, and charged with assault in the first degree on the basis of allegations that he had been involved in a serious incident on May 5, 2008. His fingerprints were found on a live bullet found at the scene of the assault. Because he was unable to post bail,
On May 14, 2010, the child's mother tested positive for marijuana, cocaine and amphetamines. During an unannounced visit from a department social worker and a Section 8 housing case manager that occurred on June 7, 2010, the mother admitted to having used marijuana and cocaine three times over the past weekend while the child and LR were in the care of their maternal grandmother. On June 11, 2010, department personnel again sought orders of temporary custody for the child due to the mother's substance abuse relapse and placed the child and LR in the foster home where the child had been placed in 2008. On June 16, 2010, Judge Dannehy reviewed the specific steps ordered for the respondent and added a step for individual counseling. The court also granted a motion filed by the child's attorney for psychological evaluations of the parties.
The mother was taken to Amethyst House in New Haven for inpatient substance abuse treatment, but she left without completing the program. The Section 8 case manager closed the mother's file due to her failure to comply with treatment goals. The mother did not tell the department personnel that she had lost her apartment until July 8, 2010. She requested outpatient treatment for substance abuse, but refused to inform department personnel of her whereabouts. The respondent was incarcerated awaiting trial on the assault and robbery charges at the time the mother relapsed and lost their apartment.
On September 1, 2010, the respondent and the child's mother agreed to the order of temporary custody and pleaded nolo contendere in response to the allegation that the child was neglected. The child was recommitted to the custody of the petitioner. The court, Frazzini, J., ordered additional steps for the respondent, specifically parenting and individual counseling.
Later in September, 2010, a jury found the respondent not guilty of the assault charges, and he was released from custody. On September 29, 2010, he filed a motion to modify the disposition of the child from commitment to protective supervision. In his motion, the respondent represented that he had been released from prison, was sharing a one bedroom apartment with the child's maternal grandfather and living apart from the child's mother. He also identified the parenting, educational and training programs he had
Judge Keller ordered that a consolidated trial be held to address all pending matters in the case, i.e., the petitions to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents, the maternal guandmother's motion to transfer guardianship of the child and the respondent's motion for modification. The court granted a motion filed by the child's attorney for interactional evaluations of the child with the respondent and others. Judge Wollenberg conducted the consolidated trial over several days between December 9, 2010, and May 2, 2011. The court issued its memorandum of decision on August 11, 2011.
In addition to the facts previously set out, the court made the following findings as to the respondent himself. The respondent was born on May 11, 1980, in Brooklyn, New York, and moved to Connecticut with his parents in 1992. He claimed to have had a fair relationship with his parents, whom he credits for making him the man that he is. He got his first job when he was eighteen and dropped out of high school when he was in the twelfth grade. The respondent has been employed by Chili's, Wal-Mart and Rainforest Cafe' for varying lengths of time. He also has performed landscaping work for which he was paid "under the table." At the time of trial, the respondent was not employed.
The respondent has a significant criminal history, having been arrested eight times since March, 1999, and convicted of several felonies. He was incarcerated from February, 2000, until April, 2004, for conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. He also was convicted of assault in the third degree, robbery in the first degree, carrying a dangerous weapon, larceny in the third degree, possession of narcotics and carrying/selling a weapon. While he was in prison, the respondent received training in the culinary arts. At the time of trial, the respondent was on probation arising from his conviction of the December, 2008 drug related crimes.
The respondent has never been married, but he has fathered five children by four different women. His two oldest children, a son and a daughter, were born four months apart in 1999 and 2000. In September, 2004, the respondent was involved in an incident of domestic violence involving the mother of one of those children.
The court found that, at the time of trial, the respondent was on probation for his 2009 conviction on drug charges. He was residing with the child's maternal grandfather, whose motor vehicle he drove. Although he is unemployed, the respondent claims that he purchases things that the child needs. He claims that he and the child's mother are no longer romantically involved, but that they remain friends and she is dependent on him.
As to the child, the court found that she has thrived in her foster home. Aside from asthma, she has no significant health issues. When the child was first placed with her foster family, she attended a licensed day care facility, where she formed healthy relationships with her
During the time that the child lived with the respondent and the mother, the child's maternal grandmother cared for her and LR when her parents went out. According to the maternal grandmother, she also watched the children while the mother went "clubbing." After the respondent was arrested in February, 2010, the mother had a difficult time maintaining the household in his absence and relapsed into substance abuse. The petitioner again assumed custody of the child in June, 2010. The child and LR were placed together with the foster family that first cared for the child in June, 2008.
The child's foster parents reported that the child's transition back into their home was difficult. She had nightmares and sleep disruptions. The child also was unable to return to her previous day care provider for a period of time because she did not want to be separated from her foster parents. Although the day care was safe and familiar to her, the child had to return on a part-time basis. Subsequently, she has done well.
The child interacts positively with the respondent and the mother when she visits with them. During some of the earlier visits, the child sought out her foster father for reassurance. Her foster father transports the child to those visits, as she experiences significant anxiety about getting into a motor vehicle with anyone else. Bruce Freedman, who conducted a court-ordered psychological evaluation of the child on August 24, 2010, described the child as "secure and strongly attached to [the foster parents], and regarded them in every way as mom and dad. Her best interests would be served by having her remain in this home, and by securing the permanence and stability of this home through legal measures." Freedman also found that the child has a significant attachment to LR.
During her life, the child has lived with her biological mother for six and one-half months and the respondent for three months. The court found that she may have developed relationships with her maternal and paternal half-siblings during that time, but she has never resided with them. The child's maternal grandmother provided child care for her during the six and one-half months the child lived with her mother.
The court supported its conclusion that the respondent's parental rights should be terminated by finding that, at the time the child was found neglected, the respondent's presenting problems were unemployment and eviction. He had a significant criminal history and continued to reside with the child's mother while she was abusing substances, even while she was pregnant with the child. Moreover, the respondent failed to comply with the steps to facilitate the child's return, remains involved with the criminal justice system and was reluctant to comply with programs as offered. He has been involved with child protective services since 2004, and the services provided to him have been unsuccessful in mitigating the issues identified by child protective services.
As to the child, the court found that she needs a permanent home where she can continue to flourish and grow and that her preadoptive foster parents are committed to ensuring that she is in a safe, loving and consistent home. At the conclusion of the trial, the child was three years and three months old. She has exhibited a limited bonding with the respondent due to his reluctance to accept his role as a parent. The child has developed a strong bond
Pursuant to § 17a-112 (j)(2), the court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interest. The court balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of her maintaining a connection with the respondent. The court found that it was not in the child's best interest to maintain a legal relationship with the respondent. His judgment and conduct remain questionable and have not improved since the child was taken into the petitioner's care. The child has a pressing need for permanence and stability. The respondent requires much time to address his issues, undertake the necessary counseling and succeed in it to establish himself in the community and show that he is capable of being a safe, nurturing and responsible parent in the child's life. The court could not foresee the respondent's having the ability or the opportunity to follow the regimen necessary for the child to maximize her abilities and achievements. The court therefore terminated the respondent's parental rights with respect to the child.
On appeal, the respondent claims that the three bases for the court's finding that he had failed to rehabilitate are not supported by the record. Specifically, he claims that there is no support in the record for the court's finding that he (1) had not complied with steps to facilitate the return of the child to his care, (2) remains involved with the criminal justice system and (3) was reluctant to comply with programs as offered, has been involved with child protective services since 2004 and has been unsuccessful with the help of programs offered in mitigating the issues identified by child protective services. We disagree with the respondent's claims.
"On appeal, we review a trial court's finding that a parent has failed to rehabilitate... in accordance with the rules that apply generally to a trier's finding of fact. We will overturn such a finding of fact only if it is clearly erroneous in light of the evidence in the whole record. ... We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. ... [O]n review by this court every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court's ruling." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn. App. at 669, 783 A.2d 534.
The respondent first claims that the court improperly found that he had not complied with the steps to facilitate the return of the child. We disagree.
The issue presented by the respondent's claim is whether he attended and completed the programs to which he was referred. In support of that claim, the respondent points to some discrepancies between the department's social study in support of termination of parental rights petition (report) and the testimony of department personnel. We acknowledge that there are some discrepancies as to whether the respondent participated in and completed certain programs,
A review of the steps ordered by the various trial courts is in order. At the time the child was adjudicated neglected, Judge Keller ordered the respondent to participate in parenting and individual counseling to increase his parenting skills, address substance abuse and domestic violence, submit to substance abuse assessment and random drug testing, secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income, have no further involvement with the criminal justice system and consistently meet the child's needs. See footnote 5 of this opinion. Judge Dannehy ordered additional final steps in December, 2009, including family counseling to increase the respondent's awareness of parenting skills, substance abuse, domestic violence and mental health issues. When department personnel took temporary custody of the child in June, 2010, Judge Dannehy reviewed the specific steps for the respondent and added individual counseling with goals for the respondent to "address & gain insight regarding [substance] abuse & criminal involvement & the impact on family & children. Domestic violence: no further family violence and/or to others." On September 1, 2010, when the child was recommitted to the custody of the petitioner, Judge Frazzini ordered further additional steps for the respondent, namely, parenting and individual counseling with goals to "1. Address anger issues to avoid any further incidents of violence, 2. Address & gain insight regarding parental substance abuse & criminal involvement and the impact of these issues on the family & on children." Judge Frazzini ordered the respondent to take advantage of the services offered while he was incarcerated and to submit to substance abuse evaluation and treatment, if recommended.
On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that the court's finding that the respondent failed to complete the specific steps ordered is not clearly erroneous. There is evidence that the respondent was arrested, convicted of drug charges and placed on probation approximately six months after he was ordered not to have further involvement with the criminal justice system. Although two of the specific steps ordered for the respondent were to find adequate housing and legal income, he has failed to do so.
As noted, the court conducted a consolidated trial that encompassed not only the termination of parental rights petition, but also, the respondent's motion to modify disposition to protective supervision pursuant to Practice Book § 35a-16. The purpose of a consolidated trial is "to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to promote judicial efficiency." State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213, 266, 849 A.2d 648 (2004). When ruling on a motion to modify disposition, the judicial authority "shall determine whether a modification is in the best interests of the child. ..." Practice Book § 35a-16. In ruling on the respondent's motion to modify disposition, the court found that "[the respondent] cannot even take care of and support himself. He lives with maternal grandfather in a one bedroom apartment, drives a car owned by the
On appeal, the respondent argues that he has stable housing with the child's maternal grandfather in a one bedroom apartment.
The respondent's second claim is that the court improperly found that he remains involved with the criminal justice system. The court found that the respondent has a significant criminal history predating the child's birth.
The basis of the respondent's claim is that he was found not guilty of the assault charge. We have some sympathy for this argument, however, the trial court did not find the respondent's incarceration while awaiting trial on the assault charge to be a basis to terminate his parental rights with respect to the child. The court found that the respondent was on probation on a drug related conviction. The respondent did not address the court's probation finding on appeal. We cannot conclude that the court improperly found that the respondent remains involved in the criminal justice system. Compare In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn.App. 619, 624, 5 A.3d 575 (2010); In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 846-47, 949 A.2d 1266, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923, 958 A.2d 150, 151 (2008). Should the respondent violate the terms of his probation, he well could be reincarcerated. The respondent's claim therefore fails.
The respondent's third claim is that the court improperly concluded that he was reluctant to comply with programs and that he has been involved with child protection services since 2004 and the services provided to him have been unsuccessful in mitigating the issues identified by child protective services. We disagree.
"[T]he adjudicatory determination to be made by the trial court is whether the parent of a child who has been found by the [trial] court to have been neglected and uncared for in a prior proceeding has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. . . . Personal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . . In conducting this inquiry, the trial court must analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child. . . . The trial court must also determine whether the prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 360-61, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).
"Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than `any' rehabilitation. . . . Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation." (Citations omitted.) In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 500, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003).
The specific steps ordered for the respondent were intended to facilitate his rehabilitation. Whether the respondent was rehabilitated is demonstrated, not by mechanically tallying up his attendance at programs and services, but by whether he has gained insight into the problems that gave rise to the department's involvement in the life of the child and whether he has made appropriate changes in his behavior. Attendance at programs and services is not a means unto itself, but facilitates behavioral changes that contribute to rehabilitation. The respondent's direct testimony demonstrates his awareness of the issues he was facing and his failure to rehabilitate:
"[The Respondent's Counsel]: And so are you aware that [the department] has some serious concerns, mother's stability and substance abuse?
"[The Respondent]: Yes, very aware.
"[The Respondent's Counsel]: What's your current relationship with the children's mother?
"[The Respondent]: Well, I provide her with emotional support. And from this point, we visit each other, we see each other. We be intimate. But other than that, we have conversations and we are clear to each other that if the children come to me, that she won't be able to come around. I won't be able to see her like that, because I want the kids to be first of my life, as far as me raising them as a father. And once she is straight with as far as [the department and the department] feels she has no more issues and she is granted parental supervision, everything like she is supposed to be doing, I have no issues with her coming around if the kids are supposed to come to me. As long as the kids are living with me, she already knows that she won't be able to come around like that unless [the department] approves it or vice versa, you know."
On cross-examination by the assistant attorney general, the respondent testified further about the child's mother:
"[Assistant Attorney General]: You would keep mother at arm's length from the children, correct?
"[The Respondent]: Yes.
"[Assistant Attorney General]: Because, in your opinion, mother is not ready to parent; is that accurate?
"[The Respondent]: No.
"[Assistant Attorney General]: Well, then, why would you keep the mother away from her children?
"[The Respondent]: Due to issues that you all have with her.
"[Assistant Attorney General]: I see.
"[The Respondent]: So I am going to respect those decisions that you all make, and I'm going to respect that and enforce it.
"[The Respondent]: When she was being a parent with my children, she was doing a real good job."
In response to a question from the court, the respondent testified, with respect to the mother: "We do want to be a family, but [the department] is making it not happen. They're saying we're not suitable for each other. They're saying [the mother] has an addiction problem."
The respondent's testimony demonstrates that he lacks an appreciation of the mother's substance abuse and parenting issues, and how those issues affect the child. Moreover, the respondent is dependent on the children's maternal grandfather to meet his needs.
In his reply brief, the respondent addressed the petitioner's argument that the respondent was "enmeshed in a relationship with the mother whose problems and drug use he minimized." The respondent contends that the court made no such finding and that the petitioner failed to raise the issue as an alternate basis to affirm the judgment terminating his parental rights with respect to the child. Moreover, the respondent argues that the petitioner's argument fails because the record does not support the assertion that he is enmeshed in a relationship with the child's mother. We disagree as the respondent's testimony clearly establishes, although he denies it, that he has an ongoing relationship with the child's mother. He testified that he provides emotional support for her, makes telephone calls for her and takes her to appointments. He also has intimate relations with the mother and impregnated her during the course of the trial.
The respondent also argues that, before his relationship with the child's mother may be relied on as a basis for termination, he has to be made aware that the relationship poses an obstacle to reunification. Even if the court did not issue a specific order with respect to the respondent's relationship with the mother and her family, "[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by the department." In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn.App. at 670, 783 A.2d 534. The respondent's testimony indicates that he is aware of the petitioner's
As to the respondent's argument that the court made no finding that he was enmeshed in a relationship with the child's mother, that finding is implicit in the court's decision. In two successive paragraphs in the memorandum of decision, the court found that, at the time the child was adjudicated neglected, one of the respondent's presenting problems was his continuing "to reside with [the] [m]other while she was abusing substances." The court found that final steps were ordered for the respondent on December 17, 2009, and on September 1, 2010, and that the respondent failed to comply with the steps to facilitate reunification. The December 17, 2009 specific steps include family counseling to "increase parenting skills, substance abuse, [domestic violence], address mental health." The September 1, 2010 specific steps include parenting and individual counseling to "address & gain insight regarding parental substance abuse & criminal involvement & the impact of these issues on the family & on children." As the respondent himself testified, he thinks the child's mother is a good parent and that only the department believes she has issues that need to be addressed. Such testimony demonstrates that the respondent has not gained the insight necessary to be a responsible parent in the life of the child. Our courts are permitted to rely on evidence of a parent's continuing association with a party who poses a risk to a child in determining whether a parent has failed to rehabilitate. See In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 562 n. 20, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).
On the basis of our thorough review of the court's memorandum of decision and the record, we conclude that the court's finding that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate is not clearly erroneous. The finding is legally correct and supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Barros attested that the child's mother had been in a relationship with the respondent for approximately one year. The mother had a history of substance abuse that predated and continued during her pregnancy with the child. The mother has older children who had been removed from her custody. The mother was attempting to find stable housing so that her older children could be returned to her. She had been involved with a man who abused her.
The respondent reported that he had been involved with the mother for approximately one year, but that they were not currently together. He is older than the mother and felt like he was her parent. He and the mother argue. The respondent admitted to having grabbed and shaken the mother. He also reported that he has three older children by other women. During his life, the respondent has been involved in many fights and has been incarcerated. When he was a child, he was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and prescribed Ritalin. He stopped taking the medicine when he turned eighteen and did not feel that he needed it. Barros observed that the respondent was in a constant state of motion and the respondent presently feels he needs the medication.
Barros found infant supplies in the respondent's one bedroom apartment, which was neat, but only partially furnished. Barros observed two large knives in the respondent's bedroom, and the respondent showed her two sword-like knives. The respondent told Barros that he collects knives. Barros' investigation revealed that the respondent was involved in a case of domestic violence with the mother of one of his children and that he is a convicted felon.
Barros identified the presenting concerns as the parents' history of domestic violence, the mother's abuse of illegal substances during the pregnancy and the respondent's criminal history and knife collection.
The mother has had significant relationships with three men, but she has never been married. She had children with two of the men. She was involved with Gilberto R. for five years and became pregnant with his children when she was fourteen and again when she was seventeen. The child's maternal grandmother gained temporary custody of those two children to allow the mother to achieve stability and to find an apartment. See footnote 13 of this opinion. The mother was ordered not to have unsupervised visitation with those children. The mother was involved with Luis C. for approximately two years. She described Luis C. as abusive and jealous. He once beat her so severely that she had to be hospitalized with a broken jaw. Eventually she reported the abuse to the police. Luis C. was incarcerated, but the mother did not receive services to address domestic violence. During the summer of 2010, Luis C. sought to resume his relationship with the mother and stalked her. The mother became involved with the respondent and had two children with him. The mother claims that she is no longer in a romantic relationship with the respondent, but that he is a support for her. But see footnote 11 of this opinion.
The mother was arrested with the respondent on December 2, 2008, on drug related charges. The charges against the mother were nolled.
"The Court: Isn't it the grandmother who is asking for—to have a transfer of guardianship, is she included in this?
"[The Respondent]: Yes.
"The Court: So you have no objection to her taking care of the children?
"[The Respondent]: I don't. If the court finds her suitable, my children being with me in the grandfather's house in the one bedroom, then I wouldn't mind the grandmother having custody of the children until I do get my apartment and do what I got to do myself." See footnote 13 of this opinion.
At the consolidated trial, Judge Wollenberg found the maternal grandmother's credibility to be dismal. He denied the maternal grandmother's motion to transfer guardianship to her stating that a thorough review of all of the evidence makes clear that the maternal grandmother is not a proper person to be given guardianship of the child. The court found, in part, that the "history of the manner in which [the mother] was parented as a child of fourteen and thereafter ... gives this court reason for pause and question concerning the credibility of events in the lives of the members of this family. ... [From the time the mother first gave birth in 2001, she] was allowed to engage in a lifestyle with little or no guidance from [the maternal grandmother]. [The mother] was involved in the drug scene, associating with male companions with domestic violence tendencies and living however she wanted. She was not required to attend school, to parent her children, or to grow and mature to adulthood." Moreover, the court found the maternal grandmother claims "she was unaware of the fact that at her birth, [the child] was removed from [the mother]. ... [The maternal grandmother] claims she was unaware, at least at times, that [the mother] had a substance abuse problem."
The respondent testified as follows when questioned by the court:
"The Court: So at this point, if we finish this trial, and the court makes a decision to give guardianship to maternal grandmother, you have no objection?
"[The Respondent]: I have no objection to that."
"[The Respondent's Counsel]: [W]hat would the sleeping arrangements be if both of the kids were returned to your custody and you .. . continued to live [with the maternal grandfather]?
"[The Respondent]: Well, both of the children already have ... beds available to them. So my father-in-law already said that it will be the same. It will be just me and the two children in the bedroom, and he will take the living room and the futon until I get a job and save up for my own apartment and let the kids have their own room."
